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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JERRY ARTHUR 'VI-IITE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs

NICOLE EDITH 'VHITE,

Case No.
12960

Def endant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE .GASE
This is an action for divorce wherein each of the
parties sought a decree of divorce and custody of the
minor child of the parties, Nicolette. Defendant-appellant also sought child support and an award of attorney's
fees.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The District Court with the Honorable :Merrill C.
Faux, .T udge, presiding, awarded plaintiff-respondent
a decree of divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty, in
that the defendant had excluded the plaintiff from her
activities and had company with other men, and awarded
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to the plaintiff-respondent the care, custody and control
of the minor chilcl of the parties on the grounds that it
would not he in the best interests of the minor child to
be placed in the custody of the defendant-appellant.
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that this Court should affirm
the decree of divorce as entered by the District Court
that the divorce was awarded to the plaintiff-respondent
together with the care, custody and control of the minor
child.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Appellant and respondent were inter-married on
.Tune 13, 1969, in the State of California. A female
child. Nicolette, was born to the parties l<'ebruary 23,
1968 ( R-1) . Prior to the commencement of the college
year, 1969, the parties moved to Salt Lake City, and
established a matrimonial domicile. The parties resided
together as husband and wife until the Summer of 1971,
when appellant journeyed to San Francisco, to attend
gardnate school and obtain her master's degree. During the time she was attending school in San l<-,rancisco,
she had used some drugs (R-83 thru 86) and had intercourse with a professor at San Francisco State College
(R-82) (R-138-139).

Thereafter, on or about the 25th day of July, 1971,
the respondent brought the minor child of the parties
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to reside with him in Salt Lake City, and on or about
the 10th of August, 1971, the complaint was filed commencing this action (R-lp7). In the interim appellant
·went to a "gestalt" workshop at Esalan, and had
another chance to engage in an act of infidelity (H-73
thru 79) an<l, in fact, admitted intercourse with another
man (R-78).
Trial was held before the Honorable l\IeITill C.
Faux, .Judge, on April 25th, and 26th, 1972, and thereafter on l\Iay 26th, 1972, the Court entered its findings
of fact and conclusions of law and decree of divorce
awar<ling the respondent the decree of divorce and the
care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, }\f icolette.
The trial court found that the appellant had excluded the respondent from her activities by keeping
company with other men (R-53-54) and that she had
conclucted her personal life in such a manner that it
would he in the best interests of the minor child to award
custody of the minor child to the plaintiff. The Court
found that the defendant had engaged in several extramarital relationships, that she had put the attention and
acclaim of other men ahead of her marriage and her
minor child, and that she had kept company and slept
with other men while the minor child was present ( R-54).
The transcript of the trial is replete with testimony
of the appellant herself concerning her infidelity and
infidclity while the minor child, Nicolette, was present
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R-G.5-66-70-71-72-73-74-78-79-81). Further, the recor<l

clearly shows that the appellant was overly concerned
with her e<lucation (R-90-101-110-121-122).
After the commencement of this action the parties
attempted a reconciliation, but separated again on or
ahout October 1, rn71 (R-69). On Thanksgiving Day
of 1!>71, the respondent found appellant engaged in
sexual intercourse at her residence with

"~like"

'

with

the minor chilcl of the parties in the next bedroom. A
fight ensued between respondent and the other man
( R-70 thru 7:3 and 118). Thereafter, the appellant took
the minor child of the parties contrary to the temporary
order of the parties to the State of California, and admitted at the time of trial that while there for a perio<l
of about four weeks lived with another man, to wit:
~Iike Isscl (ll-65 thru ()7 and 126). The respondent in
this matter is a young man who has now received his
master's degree and notwitlistancling the fact that several years ago he had hy his own admission engaged in
the use of marijuana and certain other drugs, he has
now completely reformed and has not for more than
a year prior to the commencement of this action used
any type of drug (R-152-153). Further, he has made
what the District Court found adequate aITangements
for caring for the minor child of the parties. The respondent loves the child; they have shown a great deal
of affection and fondness for each other, and he is a
good father (R-G9-70).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DECREE OF DIVORCE TO
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
'Vhile a divorce in the State of Utah may be
granted to both parties jointly where both are equally
at fault, whether one or the other or both should be
given a decree of divorce should be left to the sound
discretion of the Court. In 1ll11lli11s 'V8 1llullins. 26 U. 2cl
82, "t85 P. 2cl <>G3 ( 1971), the Court found grounds for
dinwce on both sides and stated that it would have
awarded the dinwce to both parties hut Utah law did
not allow such a procedure. The trial court awarded the
dinJl'ce only to the wife. On Heview, the Supreme
Comt held that Utah law does allow a divorce to be
granted to both parties where the facts find each of the
parties equally at fault; however, the Supreme Court
declined to reverse the trial court even though the decree lJeing grantecl to the wife was based upon misunderstanding of the law. The Supreme Court held that even
under these circumstances whether one or the other or
both should he given a divorce should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial court based upon the evidence
adduced, 486 P. 2d at page 664. See also Grazimw vs
Graziano, 7 U. 2d 181, 321 P. 2d 931 ( 1958).
The record in the instant case is clear that the appellant caused the respondent great mental suffering
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hy a repeated course of infidelity. During most of this
time appellant had the parties' minor child with her
causing the respondent great concern over the child's
welfare, to the extent that he has been compelled to go
to the child's aid to remove her from such circumstances
(R-1:32 and 72-73). The appe1lant has allowed herself
to be so attracted by the attentions from other men that
she has found it difficult to remain true to the responden and this feeling has caused her to spend time and
attention with other men rather than with the respondent
and their minor child, and slie has told him so ( R-89 thru
Ul).
The appellant has further placed her desire for
schooling above her marital responsibilities spernling
time away from home and leaving the matrimonial
domicile with the pa1ties' child, against respondent's
wishes to pursue her schooling (R-134-135). Respondent, on the other hand has not been guilty of a single,
nncondoned act of infidelity.
Appellant in her brief has alluded to an incident
which occurred in California, which incident was prior
to the parties establishing a matrimonial domicile in tl1e
State of Utah, and hence would not he grounds for
din>rce on the part of the appellant and "\vhich act of
infidelity was fully condoned and forgiven by the appellant . (H-127) .. The appellant attempts to show
grounds for her divorce being his temper and her being
afraid of him. He called her "slut" and "bitch" (R-124125). I submit that these arc justifiable terms of en··
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dcarment when you cateh your wife in bed with another
man, or when she admits sexual intercourse with other
men on three or four occa~ions.
In the Gra;r,iano case, supra, notwithstanding the
fact that the Court found fault on both sides sufficient
to a grant a divorce, the Court granted the divorce to
the wife and the Supreme Court in refusing to reverse
the trial court held in substance that the Supreme Court
will not substitute its judgment for the trial courts, unless a dear prPponderance of the evidence is against the
findings and there is no practical good except moral
,·indication that can be served by reversing and ordering
a decree for the other party, and that the Court was
mindful of the propriety of indulging deference to
the trial court's judgment and should not lightly disturb
it. 321 P. 2d@ 933
POINT II
THIS COURT l\IUST REVIE'V- THE
RECORD IN A LIGHT l\IOST FA VORAllLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
A district Court of the State of Utah, sitting as
a trial court in a divorce action has a great deal of discretion in a warding divorce and custody of minor child
and its judgment will not be overtumed except where
manifest justice is worked on trial court's finding is
against clear proponderance of the evidence. (Graziano

vs Graziano, Supra)
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In TVilson 'l's TVilson, .5 U. 2d 79, 29() P. 2d 977
( 1956), the Court stated its policy
" . . . . That the trial judge has considerable
latitude of discretion in such matters and that
his judgment should not be changed lightly,
and, in fact, not at all unless it worked such
a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate
a clear abuse of discretion . . . . " (Supra at
page 981) (See also Plue/card vs Anderson,
8 U. 2d 229, 333 P. 2d 1064 (1959).
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in reviewing divorce cases will review both the facts and the
Jaw. (See Pluclwrd 'L'S Anderson, supra). Nevertheless,
in making snch review the Court will cmwass the record
in a light most favorable to the party awarded custody
hy the trial court (Rowe 'L'S Rowe, 12 U. 2d 291, 36/)
P.2d ( 19()1) and Sorensen 'L'S Sorensen, 18 U.2d 102,
417 P. 2d 118 ( 196()) . In reviewing the record in a light
mo~t favorahle to the respondent there is no doubt as
to the correctness of the trial court's decision; and furthermore, even viewing it in a light most favorable to
the appellant does not change any of the facts or alter
any of the facts of infidelity and certainly should not
alter the Court's findings.
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S
DISCRETJON IN AvVARDING CUSTODY OF THE .MINOR CHILD TO
RESPONDENT.
Since the 1969 General Session of the Utah State
Legislature, the often used presumption that a mother
is best suited to care for the minor child of the parties
has been altered, and a new public policy has been d.;>clared. At the present time there are several facts that
must be taken into consideration by the finder of facts
in addition to this presumption.

Section ao-3-10, UC.A ( rn.~3, as amended by L.
1969, Ch 72 S 7) reads in pad as follows:

" . . . . in determining custody the Court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the

past conduct and demo11stratcrl mural standardJJ

of each of the parties and the natural presumption that the l\Iother is best suited to care for
the young children . . . . " (emphasis added)
Prior to the above quoted amendment to the statute the presumption was that the Mother was best suited
to care for the minor children and except in extreme
cases of unfitness on the part of the l\lother the chiltlren would not be taken from her. This clearly is not
the status of the law at the present time.
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Respondent would call this Ilonorable Court's attention to the fact that every case cited by the appellant in her brief relative to past conduct an<l moral
standards of the parties are cases which were decided
by this Court prior to the 1969 amendment. See Dearden
'l's Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P. 2d 230 (1964); Briggs
'L'S Briggs, 111 U. 418, 181 P. 2d 223 ( 1947); Stuber
vs Stuber, 121 U. 632, 244 P. 2d 6.50 (19.52), and IJic·
Broom vs IJicBroom, 14 U. 2d 393, 384 P. 2d 961
( 19()3).
These foregoing cases are clearly not in accord
with the present Utah law which requires the finder of
fact to weigh the conduct and the moral standards of
eaeh of the parties in deciding in what is best for the
minor children.
Respondent would submit that the appellant in her
brief has overstated this old rule and would call the
Court's attention to Stoel.:.<; vs Stocks, 14 U. 2d 314,
383 P. 2d 923 ( 1963) , wherein the Court stated:
"The Rule which favors the :l\Iother is only one
of many factors which must be considered and
is applicable only if all things are equal." Id
at P 924. (emphasis theirs).
The trial court in this matter after hearing the
testirn011v of both of the parties after viewing their demeanor ~nd manner in Court found that the appellant
so conducted her personal life that it was repulsive to
the standards of this community and that her morals are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sueh that it would be detrimental to the best interests
of the minor child to allow the minor child to reside with
the appellant. The Court further found that because
of her loose morals aIHl de'sire to he with other men even
while the minor child was present that these were factors
which the statute specifically mandated that the Court
should take into consideration and the Court correctly
took these matters into consideration and awarded the
respondent the custody of the minor child. In Stock.fl vs
Stocks, supra, the Supreme Court stated at page 294:
"The trial court was in a much hetter position
to understand and entluate the testimony than.
we are. The Court has observed the attitudes,
manners and personalities of the parties and
has had the opportunity to evaluate the ability
of the parties and the effect that association
with these parties will have on the child's life."
(Citing Smith vs Smith, I U. 2cl 75, 262 P. 2d
28H ( 1953).

The whole point in this matter being brought before this Court is that the trial court found that the
actions of l\Irs. \Vhite in the presence of the minor
child, Nicolette, was repulsive to the staIHlards of the
community and that it would not be in the best interests
of the minor child to allow her to remain in a situation
where her ~Iother was more concerned with the attention she was deriving from other men and where her
Mother would be living with a man and not her husSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hand. I submit to this Court that the trial court was
correct. If the appellant were to feed and bathe the
child eYery day and see that she washed her teeth, and
had dean clothes on her, that would be doing the ministerial things that a .l\iother must do; even loving a
child is not enough. 'Ve must look to the best interests
of the child and that is exactly what the trial court did.

CONCJ,USION
Respondent respectfully submits that this Court
should affirm the decision of the District Court in
awarding the respondent the decree of divorce and the
custody of the minor child, in that there is no prejudieial error that was committed by the District Court in
either the award of the divorce or the custody of the
child.
Respectfully submitted,
Lauren N. Beasley

'VARR,
FANKI-IAUSER & BEASLEY
COTRO-~IANES,

J rnlge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

430

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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